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Since its inception, official climate governance has hinged on perceptions of climate 
justice. Under the rubric of ‘common but differentiated responsibility,’ the 1992 
Framework Convention on Climate Change and the ensuing Kyoto Protocol have had 
their main impact on signatories that are high-emitting industrialized countries. The 
thirty-seven ‘Developed Countries’ listed in ‘Annex 1’ of the Convention had a special 
obligation to take the lead in reducing greenhouse gas emissions (Patterson and Grubb 
1992).1 Under the 1997 Kyoto Protocol these countries agreed to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions by 5.2 per cent below 1990 levels, and to do this by 2012.With the up-
coming expiry of Kyoto commitments, there is an urgent requirement for a new climate 
governance package deal (Depledge 2006). As a result, climate justice is firmly back on 
the agenda, and in new ways, as manifested from the highest elite levels of global 
climate negotiation to the most grassroots challenges to climate policy. The 
configuration of climate governance post-2012, and indeed its effectiveness, centres on 
these contestations over the meaning of climate justice, and its official re-articulations. 
Current climate governance, and its future configuration, thus has to be understood as a 
reflexive and dynamic process. As with any form of interstate governance, global 
climate policy seeks stabilized principles to drive its inter-governmental ‘rules of the 
game.’ Yet, forced to address the exponential challenges of climate change, and its 
                                                
1 There are now 40 countries in the Annex 1 group, which includes the European Union; this article refers 
to the group as ‘Annex 1 Countries.’  
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associated implications for justice, these principles must be subject to disordering 
challenges, and to reordering. There is an imperative to move beyond immediate 
accommodations, with new rules of the game to more effectively apprehend the 
challenges posed. Here, the mechanisms of disorderly deliberation become critical. The 
approach taken in this paper positions such disorder, centring on a contest over the 
meaning of climate justice, at the core of global climate governance.  
 
Climate governance, it may be argued, is not qualitatively dissimilar from other forms 
of global governance. All forms of official governance respond to some felt need, and 
as perceptions of that need changes, so the governance framework changes. But climate 
change poses special challenges, similar in scale perhaps to Cold War governance. 
There, the confrontation between communism and capitalism was a systemic 
confrontation, reflecting global-scale social contradictions, which posed the possibility 
of planetary annihilation, in this case through a ‘nuclear winter.’ Climate change 
likewise expresses a global systemic contradiction, in this case an ecological 
contradiction between climate stability and accumulation. Like the nuclear stand-off, 
climate change is also totalizing, and poses the possibility of making the planet 
uninhabitable. The key difference is that under the Cold War the two key players could 
negotiate with one another, to ward off annihilation: the USA and the Soviet Union 
could construct governance structures, as expressed in the notion of détente, to manage 
the confrontation. In contrast, there is no negotiating with climate change: there is no 
‘hot line’ to manage eco-social relations. Where the Cold War could be managed 
through the threat of ‘Mutually Assured Destruction,’ every effort at managing climate 
change, rather than addressing its causes, brings us closer to the possibility of 
catastrophic change.  
 
In this respect, governance structures that secure managerial ‘sub-paradigmatic’ 
adaptations to existing arrangements are counterproductive, and serve only to prefigure 
the required paradigmatic transformations (Sousa Santos 1995). Here, questions of 
reflexive governance are both urgent and fundamental. As the existing carbon-intensive 
social paradigm reaches its limits we are witnessing various efforts at managing the 
transition through global carbon markets and the application of technology (Stern 2007; 
Parry et al. 2007; Lohmann 2006). While efforts to address the problem prove 
inadequate, climate change has intensified, forcing new targets and approaches onto the 
Goodman              Disorderly Deliberation? 
 
PORTAL, vol. 8, no. 3, September 2011.  3 
table (Christoff 2006; Dorsey 2007). The resulting disorderly transition marks an 
interregnum in sociological terms, a period of social and political flux, and potential 
(Sousa Santos 1995). Indeed with the advent of climate crisis we see the emergence of 
a deep-seated challenge to society’s underlying historicity: the crisis literally imperils 
survival for human society, and insofar as carbon-intensive development underpins 
social structures, the prospect of de-carbonization challenges the very foundation of 
prevailing norms and hierarchies.  
 
The systemic ecological challenge posed by climate change, and its intensification, 
forces the agenda for climate governance. Models for addressing the crisis from within 
market capitalism have proved to be woefully inadequate; yet they have persisted. 
Weak forms of ‘ecological modernization,’ centred on carbon trading and end-of-pipe 
technologies, for instance, continue to dominate. Stronger forms of intervention, 
through fiscal policy and direct regulation for renewables, posit a ‘second modernity,’ 
with growth de-carbonized by ‘precautionary’ technologies and institutional practices 
(Beck 1995; Blowers 1997; Moll 2000). Yet the decoupling of economic growth from 
ecological degradation as promoted by ecological modernizers has become more of a 
fond hope than a present possibility. On a world scale, emissions continue to rise 
exponentially, testament to the paradox that every reduction in emissions intensity is 
more than overwhelmed by the increased scale of activity that it enables, as expressed 
in global economic growth.  
 
As ecological modernity falters in the face of persistently rising emissions, confronted 
with questions of growth and accumulation, it has quickly been overtaken by a revived 
denialism and a reactive securitization of the issue. There is, as a result, a deepened 
polarization of the policy field. Those defending the growth model, whether or not 
offering the means of emissions reduction, confront those rejecting it. The latter 
perspective encompasses a range of positions, from ecological sufficiency to ecological 
socialism and ecological feminism, and may be linked to ‘post-developmentalist’ and 
‘subsistence’ perspectives (Salleh 1997; Bennholdt-Thomsen & Mies 1999; Hornborg 
2001; Foster-Carter 2002; Ziai 2007; Kovel 2007). These psotions share the recognition 
that climate change requires a post-growth society, and that this necessarily entails the 
large-scale restructuring of social relations. As ecological modernization fails to re-
master ecology for society, we are left with a clear choice: continued burden-shifting 
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and technological optimism, versus an entirely new ecology-society nexus (Harvey 
1996).  
 
These policy confrontations play a central role in the intensifying political dynamics of 
climate justice. The failure of the current model of climate governance is a key factor 
legitimizing challenges to its ‘rules of the game.’ Indeed, we may say that we sit on the 
cusp of a paradigm-shift, one that forces awareness of humanity’s planetary agency, 
and thus awareness of its role in the face of eco-systemic impacts. The ‘Anthropocene’ 
era, in which humankind has had the capacity to reshape the bio-physical character of 
the planet, is said to have been in place since the invention of the steam engine (Crutzen 
2002). With the documented impacts of human-generated climate change, as expressed 
in climate science, that capacity translates into an imperative for global reflexivity. The 
result is a profound clash between what Chakrabarty characterizes as the history of 
humanity, the recorded histories of human justice, and the history of the species as 
expressed in climate science (2008). As historical time confronts geological time, 
global climate governance is invoked as the required mediating instrument, bridging 
human justice and climate impacts. As a site of global governance, then, climate 
governance embodies the possibility, and indeed necessity of defining and pursuing 
global climate reflexivity.  
 
Conceptualizing global climate governance  
In general terms, climate governance is the structure of authority that encompasses 
global climate policy: as a mode of governance, rather than simply government, it 
involves a range of state and non-state players, and is a field of practice rather than 
simply a set of institutions. As with any mode of authority, as opposed to coercion, 
climate governance is grounded in principles of justice. Climate governance develops 
through contestations over these principles, between ‘official’ and ‘non-official’ 
versions: principles emerge and change, from the process of interstate negotiation to 
civil society mobilization. Approaches to global governance invariably conceive of it as 
bringing order to disorder, whether by increasing the ‘density’ of interstate society, or 
by expressing the leverage of global civil society (Held & McGrew 2002). By focusing 
on reflexivity this paper seeks to invert the frame, and foreground the challenges to 
governance. Clearly there are multiple structural challenges to climate policy, as much 
from intended as unintended effects: the focus here is on the process of 
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reconceptualizing justice claims, in part to address these effects. The aim is to address 
climate governance as both a disordering and ordering process, analyzing the role of 
contestation in producing justice principles and practices.  
 
Climate change imposes its own pace of policy reform, forcing new imperatives; it also 
imposes its own remarkable scope, in terms of global reach and all-encompassing depth. 
The resulting justice challenges are manifold, and resonate across a range of disciplines. 
The focus on reflexive governance most directly engages with critical international 
relations and globalization studies. The two dominant traditions in international 
relations theory—‘realism’ and ‘idealism’—are preoccupied principally with the 
question of whether state or non-state actors are dominant (Walker 1993). Critical 
international relations, instead, addresses the process of exercising power and counter-
power at all levels (Halliday 2001). Related approaches to interpreting global 
governance have also emerged from other social science disciplines that investigate 
globalization across national-international divides (McGrew 1997). Within these fields 
there is a clear distinction between ‘globalization theory,’ which positions globalization 
as a cause of the changes it brings, and the ‘theory of globalization’ that seeks to 
explain globalization itself (Rosenberg 2000). These latter, more critical approaches to 
globalization studies, dovetail with approaches in critical international relations, and 
offer a rich inter-disciplinary frame.  
 
The relationship between global governance discourses and contending social forces is 
a focus, especially, of the neo-Gramscian international relations tradition, which 
positions the governance-contestation nexus as the key explanatory site of global 
politics (Cox 1987; Cox 2001; Gill 2002; Bakker & Gill 2003; Rupert 2003; Carroll 
2007). The aim is for constructive critique, and the generation of alternate principles 
and guides to action, in order to address climate change and realizing climate justice. 
Debates about the extent to which climate change forces a refiguring of hegemonic 
formations, and the possibilities this offers for counter-hegemonic challengers, are 
intensifying, especially with the advent of North-South instruments of climate 
governance (Levy & Egan 2003; Newell 2008; Paterson & Newell 2010). The 
attempted monetization of greenhouse gas emissions, and the construction of the carbon 
commodity, allow new forms of marketization to offset mitigation. This 
neoliberalization of climate policy offers new sites for displacement from high emitters 
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in the North, and from their Southern counterparts, and thus for new forms of 
contestation (Okereke 2008).2  
 
In this way, North-South climate policy frameworks create transnational political 
spaces, which can be used to politicize ecological unevenness. As such, North-South 
relations in climate justice are simultaneously positioned alongside fields of post-
colonial and critical development studies. Confronted by global environmental change 
the development problematic is redefined as a concern for over-consuming 
industrialized societies as well as for newly industrializing and under-developed 
societies (Robinson 2002; Biel 2000; McMichael 2003). This shared development crisis 
sets the mould for climate justice debates. Out of the confrontation between 
developmentalist and post-developmentalist models, where Southern and Northern 
exemplars are set against each other, has emerged a more explicitly ‘reflexive’ 
developmental frame, which rests on mutual recognition of shared problems and the 
pursuit of common targets (Pieterse 1998; 2004). Rather than looking to the North as a 
guide for development, or to the South for post-developmentalist scenarios, the 
‘reflexive development’ approach finds new pathways at the nexus between North and 
South for confronting and addressing globalizing pressures.  
 
The reflexive logic was exemplified by the ‘global justice movement’ that emerged in 
the mid-1990s, in which neoliberal globalism was identified as the shared problem of 
both North and South (Della Porta 2007). This allowed the identification of common 
targets, including interstate agencies charged with implementing those precepts (Starr 
2000; Reitan 2007). Neo-liberal global governance, and its failures, generated a protest 
cycle expressed in the global justice movement (Cohen & Rai 2000; Smith 2002; 
Tarrow 2005; Eschle 2005; Juris 2008). With climate change, as noted, the antagonism 
is driven by a deeper eco-systemic crisis, signaling the ‘revenge of nature’ on a 
planetary scale (Anderson 2006). Consequently, with the associated ‘climate justice 
movement’ there is a deeper and more existential community of fate. Again, challenges 
are articulated in the form of shared problems, aspirations, and targets (Roberts & Parks  
 
                                                
2 ‘North’ or ‘Global North,’ and ‘South’ or ‘Global South,’ are used here to simultaneously recognise 
social and spatial inequalities: most low-income societies are in the Southern Hemisphere, but the ‘South’ 
is also global, with extreme poverty also in the Northern Hemisphere; likewise for the high-income 
‘North’, which is both spatially concentrated and globalized. As discussed in this article, the ambiguity of 
these categories is increasingly played-out in the dynamics of inter-state climate policy.  
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2006). In this context climate justice emerges as a particularly powerful expression of 
‘reflexive development’ on a world scale. 
 
Reflexivity rests in movements, and when it comes to questions of political agency, 
accounts of global social action replicate long-running debates about the relative 
importance of instrumental as against expressive action (Buechler 2000; Della Porta 
and Tarrow 2005; Macdonald 2006). With climate action movements, research reveals 
a strong instrumental theme, centring on the rhetoric-reality gap in climate policy (Hall 
& Taplin 2007). This affirms a ‘political opportunities’ model of social movement 
mobilization where movements are interpreted as rational actors responding to 
institutional failure (Van Der Heijden 2006). At the same time, there can be strong 
expressive dimensions to climate action as a form of ethical action: here climate action 
can be an end in itself, an intrinsic defence of ethical values in the face of climate 
injustice (Connor et al 2009). As with other movements, the two dimensions are 
interwoven and play-out in ways that reflect the history and context of local 
mobilization (Calhoun 1993).  
 
There is, indeed, a key place-based dimension to the mobilization of climate justice 
claims, and thus to global climate governance. In climate governance the contradictions 
between policy and practice are most evident in particular sites of carbon policy: a 
geography of carbon policy can be traced from expanding carbon-intensive 
infrastructure in the North, to carbon trading finance houses, and then to ‘clean 
development’ offset sites located in the South (Roberts & Tofflon-Weiss 2001; 
Chatterton 2005; Plows 2008). Climate action, then, is enacted in specific places, where 
the concrete instances of climate policy failure are manifested. Such sites acquire a 
meaning that is simultaneously local and global, reflecting the spatial politics of climate 
change (Seel 1997; Griggs & Howarth 2004; Pickerill & Chatterton 2006; Bosso & 
Guber 2006;). As generative sites, these can be conceptualized as places where new 
insights emerge, and new justice claims are produced (Johnston & Goodman 2006; 
Massey 2007). Here, the territoriality of climate policy becomes a key dimension of 
politicization and mobilization (Brenner 2004; Drainville 2004; Harvey 2010). 
 
Official and non-official climate justice 
The impact of climate change has been likened to that of a third world war, one at least 
as devastating as its predecessors. In this war the Global South is in the immediate 
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firing line: the impacts of climate change for low-income peoples are now predicted to 
be disproportionate and catastrophic. In April 2007 a Report issued by the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) on impacts and vulnerability stated 
that in the South, where urbanization and industrialization are already putting pressure 
on resources and where adaptation capacity is relatively weak, climate change will have 
its most immediate negative impact (Parry et al. 2007). The Report predicted major 
water shortages due to climate change, with a potential halving in agricultural 
production in some regions of Africa by 2020, and a one-third reduction in yields in 
Central and South Asia by 2050, as well as inundation of the densely populated mega-
deltas of South and South-East Asia due to rising sea levels.  
 
In this context, those amongst Northern and Southern elites who continue to benefit 
from continued accumulation do so at an immediate and measurable cost to Southern 
peoples. But there is a sting in the tail: as nature wreaks its revenge a climate 
breakdown from which even the richest cannot insulate themselves, is now only a 
generation away. The UN Human Development Report for 2007, ‘Fighting climate 
change,’ underlines the point: 
 
Climate change is the defining human development challenge of the 21st Century. Failure to 
respond to that challenge will stall and then reverse international efforts to reduce poverty. The 
poorest countries and most vulnerable citizens will suffer the earliest and most damaging setbacks, 
even though they have contributed least to the problem. Looking to the future, no country—
however wealthy or powerful—will be immune to the impact of global warming. (UNDP 2008: 1) 
 
The asymmetries of cause and effect in climate change directly reflect global 
development divides, making the question of how to address climate change 
unalterably a question of justice. As noted, the inter-governmental Climate Change 
Convention and Kyoto process was primarily directed at Northern climate change 
culprits with the aim of reducing their emissions. The impact of that effort has been 
minimal—securing at best a one per cent reduction in overall anticipated global GHG 
emissions from 1992 levels (Christoff 2006). The key impact of Kyoto, however, was 
to create frameworks that enable the displacement of restructuring costs from North to 
South, through carbon trading. The UN’s ‘Clean Development Mechanism,’ for 
instance, certifies development projects that offset for rising greenhouse gas emissions 
in Annex 1 countries. All such projects operate to displace Northern costs, re-gearing 
Southern developmentalism to Northern needs. Driven by external financial 
imperatives rather than local ecological or developmental needs, their principal effect is 
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to disrupt and distort Southern societies, to support GHG polluters in the North, and to 
create windfall profits for carbon traders (Lohmann 2006).  
 
In many respects, however, this model is unraveling. There are two elements: first, the 
emergence of Southern emitters; and second, the increasing incidence of impacts, 
especially in Southern settings. The 1992 Convention rested on a model of climate 
justice that located the victims in the South and the culprits in the North, with Northern 
countries bearing historic responsibility and producing about three-quarters of 1992 
emissions (Jordan 1994). That model is now heavily qualified by the fact that since 
2007 non-Annex 1 countries responsible for the majority of the world’s current 
emissions, and thus must be part of any agreement to reduce overall emissions (Barker 
et al 2007).  
 
At one level the growing importance of non-Annex 1 countries is reflected in a rapid 
process of bidding-up funding commitments: since the mid-2000s Northern agencies 
and states have made increasingly generous offers of ‘adaptation’ funding, linked to 
Southern compliance with Northern mitigation models and priorities. In 2006, for 
instance, the World Bank linked the privatization of Southern energy and resources 
sectors with financial support to enable what it called ‘climate-resilient development,’ 
estimating Southern annual climate adaptation needs at up to $40 billion (World Bank 
2006). Four years later a major World Bank investigation into adaptation costs 
recalulated the estimate at between $70 and $100 billion per year (World Bank 2010). 
The World Bank estimates compare unfavourably with the $10 billion a year offer 
under the ‘Copenhagen Accord.’  
 
The Accord was assembled by the USA in the closing days of the 2008 UNFCCC 
Conference of the Parties held in Copenhagen, and marked a significant attempt to 
break away from the consensual United Nations negotiating process. The Accord 
echoes responses to the New International Economic Order in the early 1970s, which 
was effectively countered by Northern offers of development aid, and by a breakaway 
Northern configuration, the ‘Group of Six’ major economies, which began meeting 
formally in 1975 (Biel 2000). Unlike the 1970s, however, the breakdown at 
Copenhagen in 2009 should not be interpreted as the endgame, but rather as the initial 
skirmish in a major power shift, driven by the geopolitics of emissions. That geopolitics 
is now forcing a move beyond the ‘Thirdwordism’ expressed in the division between 
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Northern and Southern responsibilities, and towards a new mutual responsibility. The 
advent of a reciprocal ecological interdependency between Northern and Southern 
societies contrasts dramatically with the logic of developmental dependency. Rather 
than the South depending on the North, North and South now depend on each other. 
The confrontation between capitalist development and ecological survival expressed in 
advancing climate change is thus creating a new meta-imperative to live differently: the 
imperative creates a new inter-dependency, where, put simply, all societies depend on 
each other’s willingness and capacity to shift from carbon-intensive accumulation.  
 
This reflexive dynamic of climate justice has major implications for the governance 
model. As long as climate justice was framed mainly in terms of interstate 
responsibilities and obligations, its political logic could be confined and delimited. 
With the North defined as the principal culprit, the bulk of non-official influence on the 
governance process was North-centred and was deployed under the generic rubric of 
‘climate action’, for instance through the ‘Climate Action Network’ which was 
established in 1988 (Pearce 2010).. With the unraveling of the model established under 
the Framework Convention, new forms of political engagement and approaches to 
climate justice have emerged. Faced by growing disorder in the interstate governance 
process, climate politics has been forced out of the interstate container and has become 
subject to wider influences. Several factors are at play. Most important is the failure of 
policy and the first signs of large scale impacts on Southern peoples. Additionally, with 
the emergence of Southern elites as key players in the interstate political process, new 
unofficial counterpoints have emerged, through transnational climate justice politics. 
The result, at Muller observes, is that climate justice has increasingly revitalized and 
subsumed the pre-existing global justice movement (Muller 2008).  
 
Unofficial climate justice 
Climate Justice was first enunciated as a global set of principles at the United Nations 
World Summit on Sustainable Development, held in Johannesburg in August 2002 
(India Resources Centre 2002). The twenty-seven Principles of Climate Justice were 
written by a group of fourteen Northern and Southern NGOs, including CorpWatch, 
Friends of the Earth International, Greenpeace International, the Indigenous 
Environmental Network, and the Third World Network. The Principles of Climate 
Justice foregrounded ecological debt, stating that Northern states and corporations ‘owe 
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the rest of the world as a result of their appropriation of the planet’s capacity to absorb 
greenhouse gases’ (India Resources Centre 2002:1). Stronger involvement from 
affected peoples in the South was a priority, to allow local control and conservation 
with ‘clean, renewable, locally controlled and low-impact energy’; commodification 
and corporate influence were rejected, but market solutions were acceptable provided 
they conformed to ‘principles of democratic accountability, ecological sustainability 
and social justice’ (India Resources Centre 2002: 1). 
 
The critique of ‘false solutions,’ in particular emissions trading, was developed more 
strongly with the Durban Climate Justice Summit held in 2004. Linked to the Durban 
group ‘Carbon Trade Watch,’ the Summit gathered twenty organizations from Europe, 
the USA, Latin America, India and Africa. The resulting ‘Durban Declaration on 
Carbon Trading’ outlined the various ways in which emissions trading both undermines 
existing sustainable practices and contributes to climate change, thus highlighting the 
irony that ‘the Earth’s ability and capacity to support a climate conducive to life and 
human societies is [sic] now passing into the same corporate hands that are destroying 
the climate’ (Carbon Trade Watch 2004). Subsequently the Declaration attracted 
support from a further 163 organizations, and given the growing importance of 
emissions trading, its message had a strong influence.  
 
Drawing these players together, a ‘Climate Justice Now!’ coalition was established in 
December 2007 at the Bali ‘Conference of Parties to the UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC).’ The coalition included a range of Southern and Northern-
based NGOs and social movements that had played a central role in global justice, such 
as Focus on the Global South, the International Forum on Globalization, La Via 
Campesina, the World Development Movement and Third World Network, as well as 
signatories of previous climate justice statements. At the Bali UNFCCC the group 
issued a simple statement critical of ‘false solutions … such as trade liberalisation, 
privatisation, forest carbon markets, agrofuels and carbon offsetting,’ stressing instead 
the need to leave carbon in the ground, reduce elite consumption, entrench resource 
rights, pursue food sovereignty, and repay climate debts through North-South wealth 
transfers (Climate Justice Coalition 2007). The following year, at the UNFCCC in 
Poznam, the coalition produced a more critical position, asserting ‘we will not be able 
to stop climate change if we don’t change the neo-liberal and corporate-based economy 
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which stops us from achieving sustainable societies’ (Climate Justice Now! 2008). The 
UNFCCC process needed to make a break with ‘market ideology’ and instead looked to 
sustainable practices in the South, as ‘effective and enduring solutions will come from 
those who have protected the environment’ such as peasants, women and indigenous 
peoples.  
 
Also at Bali in 2007, a campaign network established a process for the ‘Peoples’ 
Protocol on Climate Change’ (Asia-Pacific Research Network 2007). The Protocol 
defined climate change as ‘a question of social justice … rooted in the current 
capitalist-dominated global economy which is principally driven by the relentless drive 
for private profits and accumulation’ (Asia-Pacific Research Network 2007:2). 
Accordingly it rejected ‘market mechanisms that impose the cash nexus on ecological 
priorities,’ and was critical of technological fixes. The Protocol asserted peoples’ 
resource sovereignty, and the need for affected peoples to be involved in climate policy, 
and stated that the ‘climate change crisis is not simply about adaptation and mitigation, 
but changing the whole economic framework into one of eco-sufficiency and 
sustainability’ (Asia-Pacific Research Network 2007:3). 
 
The Protocol process and the Climate Justice Now! Coalition opened several lines of 
debate in the broader climate justice movement, centring on issues of growth, 
sufficiency, technology, markets, sovereignty and climate debt. The debates were 
defined in relation to emerging climate policy, but in the run-up to Copenhagen in 2009 
they began to establish a distinct ideological field. Mobilizations at Copenhagen 
through Clima Forum, for instance, saw this emergent movement announce itself as an 
alternative source of legitimacy on climate governance—a claim that gained traction in 
the context of a failing interstate process. In a development not unlike the linkage 
between global justice protesters and Southern states at the Seattle WTO in 1999, 
Southern states blocked Northern efforts to dissolve the UNFCCC model of climate 
justice and staged a walk-out, with many official representations joining unofficial 
protesters on the ‘outside.’ But perhaps more important for the long-term development 
of climate justice principles, inside the negotiating hall some 100 states joined with the 
Alliance of Small Island States in calling for emissions reductions that would prevent 
average temperatures rising more than 1.5 degrees Celsius, thus breaking with the 
prevailing consensus that a rise of 2 degrees was acceptable, despite its impacts.  
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With these developments we have seen the centre of gravity for unofficial climate 
governance passing from a transnational climate advocacy network focused on the 
interstate process (expressed in the international Climate Action Network), to a 
heterogeneous climate justice movement that challenges climate governance through a 
transnational collective consciousness and capacity to mobilize (see Keck & Sikkink 
1998). In what follows this capacity is explored through an exploration of sites of 
climate justice, North and South.  
 
Generative sites, North and South  
Generative sites for climate justice, both North and South, are in the first instance sites 
of climate policy failure. As sites of failure, they are nonetheless also sites of possibility. 
In this respect the disorders of climate governance are themselves generative. In both 
North and South the physical manifestations of climate policy failure most dramatically 
undermine the legitimacy of the official model, and prefigure new approaches.  
 
Northern Sites 
One of the most powerful Northern examples, originating in the UK in 2006, is the 
phenomenon of the ‘Camp for Climate Action.’ As a form of strategic direct action the 
‘climate camp’ model was taken up in a number of Northern countries, in the USA for 
instance as ‘climate convergence,’ and became something of a climate justice template 
(Plows 2008; Saunders & Price 2008). Climate camps are a form of mass occupation, in 
the first instance spatial interventions, mounted as close as possible to the physical site 
of large-scale carbon emissions. The Camp is often directed at contesting the expansion 
of carbon-emitting infrastructures, whether by (temporarily) closing them down or by 
simply posing an alternative. In this way, the Camp exploits contradictions between the 
policy and practice of climate governance, and becomes in itself an embodied symbol 
of climate justice (Roberts & Tofflon-Weiss 2001; Chatterton 2005; Plows 2008).  
 
The UK’s climate camps in the years 2006-2009 centred on preventing the expansion of 
coal fired power stations at Drax (2006), Kingsnorth (2008) and Ratcliffe on Soar 
(2009), and on halting the third runway at Heathrow airport (2007). In two cases—
Kingsnorth and Heathrow—planned expansions were shelved, suggesting the 
mobilizations had their effect on policy, as well as contributing to the process of 
movement building. The Kingsnorth mobilization, for instance, was linked to a 
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campaign by the World Development Movement, which characterized the power 
station not simply as a negation of the UK’s Kyoto commitments, but as a violation of 
global climate justice principles. On a world scale, the World Development Movement 
calculated that the additional emissions resulting from the expansion of the power plant 
would have the following direct impacts:  
 
• 100,000 more people losing their dry season water supply 
• Up to 300 more people dying every year due to malnutrition 
• Up to 60,000 more people suffering from drought in Africa 
• 50,000 more people going hungry due to drought and lower crop yields 
• Up to 40,000 more people exposed to malaria 
• 20,000 people being forced our of their homes and becoming climate refugees 
• Around 30,000 more people losing their homes every year due to coastal flooding. (WDM  
 2009) 
 
More broadly, the Camps were surprisingly successful in constructing counter-sites, 
designed to unmask and contest plans to expand carbon-intensive infrastructures and 
industries (Newell 2008). As such, carbon hotspots become physical manifestations of 
climate policy failure, their meaning thus transformed: from functional mechanisms 
they become reconfigured as threats to planetary survival (a similar approach was 
observed for anti-road protests: Seel 1997). The low walls and fences that skirt the 
facilities, protecting people from the heavy machinery, become highly politicized 
boundaries protecting the facilities from climate justice claims. As their existence is 
challenged, the sites acquire intense symbolic meaning, their boundaries acquiring a 
simultaneously local and global resonance (Bosso & Guber 2006).  
 
These otherwise ordinary places become political places that symbolically ‘lift the veil’ 
on climate policy. Participation in such events is in this sense apocalyptic, designed to 
reveal what is real, through participation in collective action that models eco-centric 
living, through the creation of public and open spaces for reflection and debate on 
climate issues and how to address them, and through planning and mounting a series of 
direct actions against climate change perpetrators. Conceptualized as a generative site, 
or as a social laboratory, the Camp is defined as a place where people experience their 
own power, and where new visions and possibilities are produced (Johnston & 
Goodman 2006). What emerges is an embodied and emplaced spatial politics of climate 
change, a climate micro-politics perhaps, embedded in the macro-politics of globalized 
climate change.  
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Southern sites 
Southern climate justice movements are likewise focused on the injustices of climate 
policy, and are similarly centred on specific sites. Where Northern unofficial climate 
justice focuses on the failure to take responsibility for Northern emissions, Southern 
counterparts focus on the corollary, that is, the effort to displace responsibility for 
Northern emissions reductions onto Southern societies. Again, North-South 
connectivity is central: it is no accident that unofficial climate justice has emerged at 
the same time as international carbon markets have begun to create offset projects in 
Southern contexts (Bond 2006). A direct North-South linkage is created, through 
climate governance under Kyoto, between expanded emissions in Northern contexts 
and ‘low cost’ carbon offset projects in the South. That connection is reflected in the 
Durban ‘Carbon Trade Watch’ group, which, as already noted, has played a central role 
in the emergent climate justice movement (Bond & Dada 2007). 
 
Offset projects established under the Kyoto-endorsed ‘Clean Development Mechanism’ 
(CDM) have played a key role, as has the proposed UN ‘Programme for Reducing 
Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries’ 
(REDD). With the internationalization of emissions trading, offsetting has enabled a 
process of bidding-down the cost of emissions reduction in the search for cheapest per-
ton emissions reductions (exactly what carbon markets are designed to achieve). As 
demonstrated by the up-take in Southern offsets by EU countries in particular, the cost 
of emissions reduction under the CDM is considerably lower than the cost of emissions 
reductions ‘at home.’ Cheaper still are offsets for reduced deforestation, under the 
proposed REDD regime, which simply seeks to maintain or ‘sustainably manage’ 
existing forests. The Stern Report, for instance, pointed to REDD credits as a ‘highly 
cost-effective way to reduce emissions,’ and, not surprisingly, a number of high 
emitting countries have since sought to extend recognition to forests under the proposed 
post-Kyoto framework (Stern 2007: 537). Indeed, REDD initiatives have spawned 
more than twenty programs under a variety of funding mechanisms.  
 
Measures to reduce deforestation and degradation are clearly an important aspect of any 
global response to climate change. Deforestation and degradation of forests increase 
global emissions not just by the burning of wood, but also by allowing the 
decomposition of soil carbon, and reducing the planet’s capacity to absorb CO2 as well. 
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The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change estimates the net effect of these forest 
emissions to be about 17 percent of global emissions, with half of this coming from 
low-income developing countries in the tropics, such as Indonesia, that retain 
substantial tracts of forest. The key issue rests, however, not on whether to prevent the 
loss of these forests, but on whether programs to achieve this can be used to generate 
offset credits for continued or expanded emissions in the North (Reality of Aid 2009; 
Goodman & Roberts 2009, 2011).  
 
North-South offset mechanisms like CDM and REDD have, indeed, been targeted as 
creating new structures of global dependency, what Carbon Trade Watch calls ‘carbon 
colonialism’ that reorientates development pathways to cater for the Northern carbon 
appetite. Further, both CDM and REDD are criticized for assuming commensurability 
between present emissions and future increases in sink capacity, or reductions in 
projected emissions. There are also concerns about the vulnerability of offset schemes 
to the carbon market and to carbon speculators. Offsets are seen as linking emissions 
reductions to highly volatile carbon prices, empowering a new class of carbon 
financiers (Friends of the Earth International 2008). REDD, in particular has enormous 
scope, as it is potentially applicable to any significant Southern forest. Not surprisingly, 
the immediate impact on the peoples who live in forests, exercise ancestral domain over 
them, and rely on them, has become a major issue. In empowering carbon traders, 
REDD is seen to jeopardize the sovereign rights of people who have historically 
conserved forests, and to serve as a charter for their dispossession (International Forum 
of Indigenous Peoples on Climate Change 2008). 
 
There is a growing political revolt against carbon offsets from within countries, such as 
Indonesia, that are emerging as key sites for such projects (see Indonesian Forum on the 
Environment, WALHI, 2009). Contestation of REDD projects, and also of CDMs, 
centres on local contexts—articulated through transnational networks—with Southern 
sites politicized in confrontation with official frameworks. One example is the 
challenge to REDD projects in Kalimantan, Indonesia, that have been funded by the 
Australian Government to lay the groundwork for the recognition of carbon credits (see 
Goodman & Roberts 2010). The schemes are defined as violating justice principles, 
form the ‘polluter pays’ principle to issues of historical obligation and resulting ‘carbon 
debt.’ The world’s current reliance on the sink and carbon storage capacity of the 
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world’s remaining forests reflects the logic of global ecological injustice, with those 
who have benefited from the worldwide release of greenhouse gases arraigned against 
those who now are required to suffer the consequences. Offsets, therefore, are seen as 
compounding these climate injustices. 
 
Conclusions 
Despite the broad structural context of a newly reciprocal imperative for global 
development, as imposed by climate change, it must be acknowledged that many of the 
possibilities for disordering prevailing climate governance remain unrealized. The 
barriers to unofficial climate justice, and thus to reflexive global climate governance, 
should not be underestimated. The sheer scale of, and system-wide challenge posed by, 
climate change are themselves demobilizing. In Northern contexts there is an additional 
sense of complicity: here, rather than producing a climate movement, the intensifying 
crisis can produce a form of ‘apocalypse blindness’ (Beck 1995; Depledge 2006). In 
many contexts climate consciousness can exist as a latent subjectivity, where publics 
share an awareness of contradictions but fail to engage in social action (Doherty 2002; 
Norgaard 2006; Boycoff 2008). A tension can build up, but remain internalized, with 
the resulting crisis of belief embedded in everyday subjectivity, but repressed from 
public policy (Agyeman & Evans 2004; Dorsey 2007). We witness the deferral of 
social power to the public authorities, by which climate change is framed as a problem 
for policy elites and only incidentally for their increasingly anxious constituencies. 
 
In this scenario the constitutive power of social agency, an historical actor capable of 
remaking society, remains unrealized. Something of the scale of the problem in the 
North is reflected, for instance, in concern at the lack of mass mobilization expressed 
by the UK Energy and Climate Change Minister (and later Shadow Prime Minister), Ed 
Miliband, in December 2008:  
 
When you think about all the big historic movements, from the suffragettes, to anti-apartheid, to 
sexual equality in the 1960s, all the big political movements had popular mobilization. Maybe it’s 
an odd thing for someone in government to say, but I just think there’s a real opportunity and a 
need here. (Adam & Jowitt 2008; see also Hinsliff & Vidal 2009)  
 
Nevertheless, as suggested in the foregoing examples, the injustices of official climate 
governance can provide the antidote to passivity. The injustices of climate change are 
distanced from everyday experience, embedded in centuries of global uneven 
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development as a structural ‘fact of life,’ and normalized as inevitable. In contrast, the 
injustices of official climate governance are present, manifest, and concrete. As climate 
crisis intensifies there is a sharpened contradiction between official acknowledgement 
of the growing problem and the inadequate (often self-serving) policy responses. That 
contradiction is increasingly salient, especially across the North-South axis. Indeed, 
official climate injustice is the product of deliberate decisions: someone gains, someone 
looses, and both can be identified. There are clearly definable culprits, with specific 
installations and projects to be targeted, and disrupted. Herein, perhaps, lies the potency 
of unofficial climate justice claims, as a counterpoint to the official script, embedded in 
concrete social and ecological contradictions of climate policy.  
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